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WELL-BEING AND THE STATE
Cass R. Sunstein*
Some people think that there is a deep opposition between "gov-
ernment intervention" and "free markets." But the opposition is too
simple. No one is really opposed to "government intervention." Mar-
kets depend for their existence on law, which is necessary to establish
property rights and to set out the rules governing contracts and tort.
Short of anarchy, a system of legal entitlements, set by the state, is
inevitable.' If we are asking whether the state is an important part
of the solution to current social problems, there can be only one
answer: it had better be. But what is the relationship between the
state and social well-being?
This question assumes special significance in light of the original
aspiration of the American founders - to create a deliberative de-
mocracy.2 Public officials would be accountable to the citizenry at
large, but they were also supposed to engage in deliberative tasks,
and to profit from and to encourage deliberation among the people as
a whole. Both the structure of the national government and the
system of individual rights were intended to encourage public delib-
eration.
Things have not worked out as the Framers envisioned. One of
the most serious problems is the public emphasis on issues and events
that have little relevance to most people's lives. People lack accurate
information about what is most important. 3 In elections, for example,
"soundbite politics" often replaces discussion about public issues. 4 The
problem affects day-to-day governance too. Instead of focusing on,
for example, education and its improvement, public attention is often
directed to sensational anecdotes, crude oversimplifications of issues,
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School and
Department of Political Science. B.A. 1975, Harvard College; J.D. 1978, Harvard Law School.
I am grateful to Jon Elster, Dan Kahan, Richard Posner, Julie Roin, Geoffrey Stone, and David
Strauss for valuable comments, and to Thomas Brown for outstanding research assistance.
I "The functioning of . . . competition . . . depends, above all, on the existence of an
appropriate legal system . . . . In no system that could be rationally defended would the state
just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed and continuously
adjusted legal framework as much as any other." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 38-39 (I944).
2 See Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican
Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102, 114 (Robert A. Goldwin &
William A. Schambra eds., ig8o).
3 See SHANTO IYENGAR, Is ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? How TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL
ISSUES 127-43 (i99i) (describing the distorting effects of television news coverage); cf. STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 21, 34 (1993) (showing that public assessment of the
riskiness of many activities diverges widely from expert assessments).
4 See, e.g., KIKU ADATTO, SOUND BITE DEMOCRACY 4 (1990).
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or scandals about public officials' private lives. In these circum-
stances, we are likely to end up with misdirected policies or worse -
a form of government by faction, the evil most feared by the American
founders.5 A high priority for those thinking about the role of the
state should be to develop methods for focusing attention on things
that matter to people's lives.
An important part of this task is to establish criteria by which to
measure governmental performance. If broadly debated and well-
publicized, such criteria should promote democratic discussion and at
the same time help to counteract the very problems to which they
draw attention. To develop criteria of this kind, we need a theory of
social well-being. To be helpful, the theory must be not only sub-
stantively plausible but also practical to apply. This constraint is a
demanding one. The best substantive theory might well be abandoned
because it is not administrable - because the underlying data cannot
be compiled without great cost, because the theory does not allow
comparisons among regions or over time, or because it is too unruly
and complex.
In the United States, there are many measures of economic per-
formance. But here and abroad, gross domestic product (GDP) is the
most influential indicator of social well-being. When GDP is growing,
it is often thought that a number of good things will happen -
employment will increase, poverty will go down, and people will be
able to obtain a wide range of valuable things. Concentration on
GDP has important political effects. It focuses media, public, and
governmental attention in a distinctive way.
Part of my goal here is to show - what most economists do not
deny - that GDP is an inadequate measure of social well-being, and
that we lack an adequate alternative. GDP is too crudely connected
to things that people should care about. To overcome the limits of
GDP, I offer a simple proposal: Democratic governments should pro-
duce an annual "quality of life report," designed to measure their
performance in producing good lives for their citizens. This report
should be highly publicized and broadly disseminated. I also propose
that the ingredients in the report are plural and diverse. They are
not commensurable. Both the fact of incommensurability and the
general attack on GDP have some important consequences for law.
I suggest as well that it is important to attend to the relationship
between legal provisions and the various ingredients of individual and
social well-being. Per capita GDP, for example, becomes more im-
portant if money is both necessary and sufficient for the acquisition
of valuable things. We might ultimately be able to evaluate legal
5 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i)
(discussing the nature, cause, and effects of faction).
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provisions by exploring their relationship to the various components
of individual and social well-being. A quality of life report would
help in initiating this project.
In the course of the discussion, I offer a great deal of data about
social and economic trends within the United States. The failure to
identify the empirical dimensions of legal disputes is a continuing
weakness in the legal culture. 6 While the facts identified by a "quality
of life" report will not dispose of strictly legal debates, they do have
implications for many legal controversies, especially those involving
the criminal justice system, race and sex equality, and government
regulation.
I. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
A. In General
One of the simplest measures of social and economic well-being,
used internationally and by many nations, is gross domestic product
(GDP). The term refers to the total quantity of goods and services
produced, weighted by their respective prices. 7 Goods and services
that are not paid for are not included.
GDP is highly influential in international comparisons. It also
plays a large role in the domestic sphere. To take a crude illustration,
consider the astonishing fact that the words "gross national product"8
appeared in 16,055 major news stories in the last two years - and
that the words "gross domestic product" appeared in 39,007 stories. 9
It would be an absurd exaggeration to say that ordinary people fre-
quently talk about GDP or GNP.10 But the numbers for GDP affect
legislative deliberations, presidential judgments, media reports on the
6 In the law of free speech, for example, it is crucial to know whether an "actual malice"
regime for libel law in fact alters press behavior as compared with a negligence regime - and
whether the alterations lead to more or less information about public issues. In administrative
law, it is important to know whether stringent judicial review actually improves agency perfor-
mance.
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 437
(113th ed. 1993) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1993].
8 Gross national product (GNP) means GDP adjusted to measure the total income received
by the inhabitants of the country. It adds to GDP all interest, profits, dividends, and rents
coming into a country from abroad, and then subtracts all interest, profits, dividends, and rents
paid to people in other countries. See ECONOMIC INDICATORS HANDBOOK 59 (Arsen J. Darnay
ed., 1992). In November, i99i, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis
shifted emphasis from GNP to GDP. See id.
9 Search of NEXIS, Curnws library (Feb. i6, I994).
10 Media attention is often focused on the "leading economic indicators," including average
weekly hours, housing starts, and the money supply. These too are only crudely connected with
social and economic welfare, for reasons that will emerge in the course of the discussion.
X994] 1305
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state of the economy, professional recommendations, and much more.
A different measure would focus attention on different things.
B. Criticisms
Certainly GDP is a useful figure, for it bears a relationship to
important social goals. If we think of income as an all-purpose means
- as something that people want regardless of what else they want
- we might well attend to GDP. There are, however, a number of
problems with relying on GDP as a measure of well-being. Some of
these problems suggest that GDP is imperfect as a measure of purely
economic goals. Some of them suggest that important social, rather
than purely economic, variables are not reflected in GDP, though of
course it is artificial to distinguish the economic and the social. 11
i. GDP and Economic Well-Being. - GDP's ability to measure
economic well-being is doubtful for a number of reasons.
(a) Distributional Issues. - If income is unequally distributed, a
high GDP may disguise the fact that many people are living bad or
even desperate lives. For example, the United States has the highest
per capita real GDP in the world.12 But it also has a higher rate of
children living in poverty - one in five - than does any other
wealthy country in the world. The rate of children living in poverty
is double that of the industrialized nations taken as a whole and four
times that of Western Europe.13 Nearly half of all black children in
the United States live in poverty.14
(b) Excluded Goods and Services. - GDP does not include goods
and services that are free, including some that are plausibly connected
with economic well-being. For example, unpaid domestic labor is not
a part of GDP.' 5 Many environmental amenities, such as clean air
and water, are not reflected in GDP. The GDP figure thus fails
adequately to measure either the benefits of a healthy environment or
n See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 12 (4th ed. 1962) ("[T]here is no guarantee
that the effects produced on the part of welfare that can be brought into relation with the
measuring-rod of money may not be cancelled by effects of a contrary kind brought about in
other parts, or aspects, of welfare; and, if this happens, the practical usefulness of our conclusions
is wholly destroyed. . . .The real objection then is, not that economic welfare is a bad index
of total welfare, but that an economic cause may affect non-economic welfare in ways that
cancel its effect on economic welfare.").
12 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1993, at 135 (1993) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993].
13 See Ray Moseley, Among Rich Nations, U.S. Has Highest Child-Poverty Rate, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, § I, at 4.
14 See id.
15 See Luisella Goldschmidt-Clermont, Measuring Households' Non-Monetary Production,
in REAL-LIFE ECONOMICS 265, 265 (Paul Ekins & Manfred Max-Neef eds., 1992); MARILYN
WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED 2 (1988).
13o6 [Vol. 107:1303
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the costs of its degradation. 16 There are other gaps in what GDP
measures. It does not, for example, reflect changes in leisure time;
but it is clear that any increase in leisure is a gain. 17 Most generally,
a serious problem with GDP is that the figure excludes all social costs
and benefits that do not have prices. 18
(c) Unclear Correlations with Other Important Economic Indica-
tors. - GDP sometimes seems to be a general placeholder for a
number of indicators of economic well-being. But in fact, it may not
be closely correlated with some important indicators. Consider two
major social goals: reduction of poverty and of unemployment. Of
course GDP growth can be an important factor in counteracting both
unemployment and poverty, and nothing I say here is inconsistent
with this judgment. But it is also possible for GDP increases to be
accompanied by increases in unemployment and hence poverty (which
is closely correlated with unemployment); indeed, this phenomenon
has often happened.
Economic growth is a function of productivity growth and em-
ployment growth, where productivity is understood as GDP divided
by total employment. 19 Increases in productivity can contribute to an
increase in GDP, possibly without increasing employment levels at
all. For example, converting a plant to use industrial robots may
16 GNP needs to be modified to account for:
any depreciation of natural capital stocks, in the same way that net national income is
equal to gross national income less estimated depreciation on man-made capital. . [and]
any damage losses accruing to human wellbeing from the extraction, processing and
disposal of materials and energy to the receiving environments.
DAVID PEARCE, ECONOMIC VALUES AND THE NATURAL WORLD 31 (1993). See also the dis-
cussion of adjusted national product - GNP adjusted for depreciation of physical capital - in
Oyvind Lone, Environmental and Resource Accounting, in REAL-LIFE ECONOMICS, cited above
in note I5, at 239, 253-54; and the discussion of natural resource accounting in Robert Repetto,
Earth in the Balance Sheet: Incorporating Natural Resources in National Income Accounts,
ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1992, at 12, 15-17.
In 1993, President Clinton directed the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis to develop a new measure of GDP, one that incorporates the cost of pollution and the value
of environmental amenities. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H.
SCHROEDER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 394 (Supp. 1993).
17 In 1952, Kuznets attempted to redefine GNP to take leisure into account. See Simon
Kuznets, Long-Term Changes in the National Income of the United States of America Since
r87o, in INCOME & WEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND STRUCTURE 29, 63-69
(Simon Kuznets ed., 1952). Note also that a 1968 study showed a spectacular gain in leisure
over the last century. See A.W. Sametz, Production of Goods and Services: The Measurement
of Economic Growth, in INDICATORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 77, 83 (Eleanor B. Sheldon & Wilbert
E. Moore eds., i968).
Is See, e.g., EZRA J. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 122-66 (1967).
19 See Arthur M. Okun, Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance, in AM. STAT.
ASS'N, 1962 PROCEEDINGS BUS. & ECON. STAT. SECTION 98, 103 (1962) ("[Ihe reduction of
one point in the unemployment rate means perhaps a 1.8 percent increase in total labor input
measured in manhours. Then, to get the 3.2 percent increment in output, manhour productivity
must rise by about 1.4 percent.").
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raise production levels while eliminating the jobs of hundreds of as-
sembly workers. Increases in GDP may therefore fail to produce
increases in employment levels. Because poverty is well correlated
with unemployment, it follows too that when GDP goes up, poverty
may not go down.
The following table shows changes in GDP, unemployment, and
poverty from 1970 to the present. GDP growth rates are generally
correlated with changes in unemployment rates, particularly in espe-
cially high and especially low GDP growth years. There are, however,
years in which the two figures are not correlated. For present pur-
poses, a key point is that GDP rates are far from identical to unem-
ployment and poverty rates. If we know what happens to GDP, we
do not necessarily know what happens to unemployment and poverty.
TABLE 1
GDP GROWTH COMPARED TO LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND
POVERTY2 o
Year GDP Growth Unemployment Poverty
1970 0.0% 4.9% 12.6%
1971 2.9% 5.9% 12.5%
1972 5.1% 5.6% 11.9%
1973 5.2% 4.9% 11.1%
1974 -0.6% 5.6% 11.2%
1975 -0.8% 8.5% 12.3%
1976 4.9% 7.7% 11.8%
1977 4.5% 7.1% 11.6%
1978 4.8% 6.1% 11.4%
1979 2.5% 5.8% 11.7%
1980 -0.5% 7.1% 13.0%
1981 1.8% 7.6% 14.0%
1982 -2.2% 9.7% 15.0%
1983 3.9% 9.6% 15.2%
1984 6.2% 7.5% 14.4%
1985 3.2% 7.2% 14.0%
1986 2.9% 7.0% 13.6%
1987 3.1% 6.2% 13.4%
1988 3.9% 5.5% 13.0%
1989 2.5% 5.3% 12.8%
1990 0.8% 5.5% 13.5%
1991 -1.2% 6.7% 14.2%
1992 2.1% 7.4% 14.5%
20 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 304 (Poverty 1992) (1994) [hereinafter Eco-
NOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1994]; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 351 (GDP
1970-91), 382 (Unemployment 1970-92), 380 (Poverty 1970-91) (1993) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1993]; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1993, supra note 7, at 444 (GDP
1992).
13o8 [Vol. 107:1303
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2. GDP and Social Well-Being. - Even if GDP has some virtues
as an indicator of economic welfare, it fails to capture important
aspects of social well-being.
(a) Uncertain Relation to Valuable Things. - It is often thought
that GDP serves as a good proxy-for valuable things. But the rela-
tionship between GDP and important social goals is far from clear.
Consider, for example, the likelihood of subjection to violent crime.
Physical security is surely an important ingredient in well-being, but
it is at best indirectly reflected in GDP. Consider also the fact that
there is no inevitable connection between GDP and life expectancy.
Some countries have a relatively low GDP but long life expectancy
and low rates of infant mortality.21 Many countries have a high GDP
but do poorly in promoting longevity.22 Education is an important
part of a good life, whether or not educated people accumulate wealth;
but the association between education and GDP, while real, is crude.
Certainly we can speculate, with some plausibility, that wealthy
people are less likely to commit crimes and better able to pay for
education, and that high social wealth can and will be devoted to
improving criminal law enforcement, life expectancy, and public
health. But what has been said thus far should show that the con-
nection between GDP and these other goods is unclear.
(b) Dependence on Legal and Social Practices. - The most basic
point here is conceptual: The value of money depends on social and
21 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 199o
at 9, tbl. x.i (iggo) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT I9go] (presenting information
on Sri Lanka, Jamaica, and Costa Rica). The level of childhood immunizations puts the United
States 21st in the world, tied with Pakistan and below India, Bulgaria, North Korea, Indonesia,
and Botswana. See Moseley, supra note 13, § x, at 4.
22 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note 21, at 9, tbl. i.i. The points
discussed in the text are connected to a broader debate. Emphasizing some of the problems
with accounts inspired by utilitarianism, John Rawls proposes that judgments about well-being
might be made by reference to "primary goods." In his latest formulation, Rawls points to "a.
basic rights and liberties . . . ; b. freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against
a background of diverse opportunities; c. powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of
responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure; d. income and
wealth; and finally, e. the social bases of self-respect." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
181 (1993). This approach is in many respects a considerable improvement over utilitarian
accounts and those that rely on an aggregated figure representing the private willingness to pay.
In place of primary goods, Amartya Sen has suggested that a good measure of well-being should
focus on people's "capabilities" and "functionings." See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAM-
INED 79-84 (1993). The term "capabilities" refers to a person's capacity or opportunity to choose
among valuable activities or functionings. We might ask, for example, whether someone is able
to get access to food, medical care, shelter, education, political participation, and so forth, or
whether that person is able to avoid public and private violence, physical pain, and other forms
of suffering. Like the list of primary goods, the list of capabilities and functionings is hetero-
geneous. Its chief advantage is that it enables us to focus on the question why such things as
wealth and income are valuable, that is, what they enable people to have and to be.
HeinOnline  -- 107 Harv. L. Rev.  1309 1993-1994
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legal practices determining what money can be used to buy. If certain
exchanges are blocked - if money cannot be used to purchase valu-
able things - per capita GDP becomes less important. Wealth is less
valuable when money cannot be used to buy votes or political power,
or education, or marriage, or self-respect. Similarly, the value of
money is reduced to the extent that it is unnecessary for someone to
have money to obtain important goods. If education, health care,
political power, and clean air are free, money is less valuable.2 3
In short, the value of money is largely a function of the legal
regime. To understand the relationship between GDP and valuable
things, it is necessary to understand the set of legal entitlements
through which people are enabled to get, or are disabled from getting,
things of importance to their lives. It might then be possible to "map")
legal provisions onto the various ingredients of well-being.2 4
(c) Commensurability. - GDP is of course an aggregative mea-
sure, and it is aggregative in a distinctive sense. 25 GDP is not simply
an index of different values, created to allow ease of understanding
and comparison. Instead, it measures diverse items through the same
basic dimension of "value," defined by willingness to pay.
This approach assumes commensurability in the sense that it acts
as if diverse goods can be assessed according to the same metric. This
form of valuation seems wrong because it ignores qualitative differ-
ences among diverse social goods. 26 Some things (like education and
health) have intrinsic as well as instrumental value; other things (like
cash) are simply for use. Intrinsically valuable things are themselves
valued in different ways.
The problem with GDP is that because it is aggregative, it effaces
qualitative differences. For this reason it is a crude indicator of social
welfare and an unpromising foundation for democratic deliberation.
Suppose, for example, that we are told that if OSHA issues a certain
occupational safety regulation, GDP will be reduced by o.oor%. To
23 Of course there may be harmful social effects from prohibiting the use of money as a
basis for exchange, or from providing goods for free. Both of these decisions may mean that
there is less wealth upon which to draw. But these are different matters.
24 This is a generalization of the "entitlement approach" suggested in AMARTYA SEN, POV-
ERTY AND FAMINES 45-5I (x98i).
25 Economists and others critical of GNP have proposed a number of alternative measures.
William Nordhaus and James Tobin, two early critics, suggested that it would be better to
attempt to generate a "measure of economic welfare" (MEW). See William D. Nordhaus &
James Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, in THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PER-
FORMANCE 509, 512-13 (Conference on Research in Income & Wealth, Studies in Income &
Wealth Vol. 38, Milton Moss ed., I973).
A more recent measure is the Daly & Cobb "index of sustainable economic welfare" (ISEW).
See HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 401-55 (1989).
26 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 8-x6 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 782-90 (994).
[Vol. Io7:x3o3131O
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make a sensible evaluation, we need to know a great deal more. To
what does this number refer? Does it include greater unemployment,
higher inflation, and the scaled-back production of important goods?
Does it mean more poverty? At least in principle, it would be much
better to have a highly disaggregated system for assessing the quali-
tatively different goods at stake. People should be informed about
the diverse potential effects and make judgments on the basis of an
understanding of the qualitative differences. If all the relevant goods
are aligned along a single metric, they become less visible, or perhaps
invisible.2 7
II. EXISTING MEASURES OF WELL-BEING
A. Current American Approaches
GDP is hardly the only indicator of social welfare. In the United
States, over fifty indicators are now in use.28 The United Nations
offers many more.29 A major problem with the current American
approach is that the measures - offered in an endless and barely
intelligible succession - lack organization and clarity.30 In this sec-
tion, I describe some of the most important indicators.
The unemployment rate, announced every month, includes the
number of people sixteen years of age or older who are actively seeking
employment. 31 It therefore excludes people who are not seeking work,
even if they say that they would like a job and that they are not
27 The use of GNP creates other difficulties, but because these seem less fundamental and
in some ways more complex, I simply identify them here.
(a) GNP depends on willingness to pay and thus on existing preferences for various social
goods. One could do much worse than to make assessments on the basis of existing preferences;
people's well-being is certainly connected with satisfaction of consumption choices. Existing
preferences are not, however, an adequate guide to social well-being, because they may depend
on unjust background conditions or on simple ignorance. See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES
AND CAPABILITIES 48 (Professor Dr. P. Hennipman Lectures in Economics Vol. 7, 1985).
(b) As noted, GNP is an important method for making cross-national comparisons. But per
capita GNP is an inadequate comparative guide if there are large differences in conditions and
hence in needs. If distinctive needs are a product of local circumstances, GNP per capita will
be an inadequate proxy for well-being.
(c) The existence of positional goods poses a problem for GNP. Positional goods are those
that are valuable because only a few people have them. Status symbols of various sorts,
including luxury automobiles, are examples. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences,
102 YALE L.J. I, 18-i9 (1992). If GNP is growing partly because it includes a large number
of positional goods, it is not clear that welfare is growing as well.
28 See NoRtMAN FRUMKIN, GUIDE TO ECONOMIC INDICATORS at xiii (i99o).
29 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, supra note 12, at 129-34.
30 A possible exception is the Statistical Abstract, cited above in note 7. The abstract is
helpful, but it has many failings as well. Above all, it is so detailed that readers cannot easily
get a general picture; the latest edition includes 1433 tables.
31 See FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 224.
1994] 1311
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seeking work because they do not believe that jobs are available for
them.
The following tables show differences in employment along lines
of race and sex; these are significant because although overall unem-
ployment may be low, it is good to know whether members of iden-
tifiable social groups are disproportionately out of work. 32
TABLE 2
CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC 3 3
(Percent; monthly data seasonally adjusted)
White
All Males Females
Civilian 16-19 20 Years 16-19 20 Years
Year Workers Total Total Years and Over Total Years and Over
1975 8.5 7.8 7.2 18.3 6.2 8.6 17.4 7.5
1976 7.7 7.0 6.4 17.3 5.4 7.9 16.4 6.8
1977 7.1 6.2 5.5 15.0 4.7 7.3 15.9 6.2
1978 6.1 5.2 4.6 13.5 3.7 6.2 14.4 5.2
1979 5.8 5.1 4.5 13.9 3.6 5.9 14.0 5.0
1980 7.1 6.3 6.1 16.2 5.3 6.5 14.8 5.6
1981 7.6 6.7 6.5 17.9 5.6 6.9 16.6 5.9
1982 9.7 8.6 8.8 21.7 7.8 8.3 19.0 7.3
1983 9.6 8.4 8.8 20.2 7.9 7.9 18.3 6.9
1984 7.5 6.5 6.4 16.8 5.7 6.5 15.2 5.8
1985 7.2 6.2 6.1 16.5 5.4 6.4 14.8 5.7
1986 7.0 6.0 6.0 16.3 5.3 6.1 14.9 5.4
1987 6.2 5.3 5.4 15.5 4.8 5.2 13.4 4.6
1988 5.5 4.7 4.7 13.9 4.1 4.7 12.3 4.1
1989 5.3 4.5 4.5 13.7 3.9 4.5 11.5 4.0
1990 5.5 4.7 4.8 14.2 4.3 4.6 12.6 4.1
1991 6.7 6.0 6.4 17.5 5.7 5.5 1S.2 4.9
1992 7.4 6.5 6.9 18.4 6.3 6.0 15.7 5.4
32 See supra p. 13o8 (showing the variation in unemployment rates over time).
33 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1993, supra note 20, at 39X.
1312 [Vol. 107:130 3
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TABLE 3
CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC 34
(Percent; monthly data seasonally adjusted)
Black and Other or Black
Males Females
16-19 20 Years 16-19 20 Years
Year Total Total Years and Over Total Years and Over
1975 14.8 14.8 38.1 12.5 14.8 41.0 12.2
1976 14.0. 13.7 37.5 11.4 14.3 41.6 11.7
1977 14.0 13.3 39.2 10.7 14.9 43.4 12.3
1978 12.8 11.8 36.7 9.3 13.8 40.8 11.2
1979 12.3 11.4 34.2 9.3 13.3 39.1 10.9
1980 14.3 14.5 37.5 12.4 14.0 39.8 11.9
1981 15.6 15.7 40.7 13.5 15.6 42.2 13.4
1982 18.9 20.1 48.9 17.8 17.6 47.1 15.4
1983 19.5 20.3 48.8 18.1 18.6 48.2 16.5
1984 15.9 16.4 42.7 14.3 15.4 42.6 13.5
1985 15.1 15.3 41.0 13.2 14.9 39.2 13.1
1986 14.5 14.8 39.3 12.9 14.2 39.2 12.4
1987 13.0 12.7 34.4 11.1 13.2 34.9 11.6
1988 11.7 11.7 32.7 10.1 11.7 32.0 10.4
1989 11.4 11.5 31.9 10.0 11.4 33.0 9.8
1990 11.3 11.8 32.1 10.4 10.8 30.0 9.6
1991 12.4 12.9 36.5 11.5 11.9 36.1 10.5
1992 14.1 15.2 42.0 13.4 13.0 37.2 11.7
The poverty level emerged from the ig6i plan of the Department
of Agriculture. 3 5 Like judgments about unemployment, the judgment
about who is poor is far from a simple matter of fact.36 The i96i
estimate measured how much money was necessary to meet nutritional
requirements, and this amount was multiplied by three to determine
the total income necessary to meet all living expenses. 37 Poverty
thresholds have been updated every year by taking into account the
consumer price index. Hence, the annual threshold for a family of
four was $3169 in 1964, $ii,6iI in 1987, and $13,924 in 1991.38
The official measure of poverty does not include noncash income;
it therefore excludes "food stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, school
lunches, and subsidized rental housing."39
34 See id.
35 See FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 196.
36 See SEN, supra note 24, at 9-23 (discussing possible concepts of poverty).
37 See FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 196. The "multiplication by three" is of course quite
crude. It was based on a 1955 study showing that food consumes one-third of the average
household budget. See id.
38 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-6o, No. I8I,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at A-6 (Aug. 1992).
39 FRUMKIN, S1.pra note 28, at 195.
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TABLE 4
PERSONS AND FAMILIES BELOW THE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL40
Families Below Poverty Level
Number Percent of
(millions) Population
Persons Below Poverty Level
Number Percent of
(millions) Population
Of course, there are large disparities in terms of race and sex in
the percentage of persons and families living in poverty.41
The consumer price index, the most important indicator of the
rate of inflation, is designed to reflect price changes for a set of goods,
including housing, clothing, food and drink, medical care, entertain-
ment, education, and tobacco products. 42 Annual percentage changes
show striking disparities over time:
40 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1993, supra note 20, at 380, tbl. B-28.
41 See id. (showing that the percentage of blacks living in poverty is nearly triple that of
whites, and that the percentage of black female householders in poverty is nearly double that
of white female householders).
42 See FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 63.
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All Items All Items Excluding
Year All Items Excluding Energy Food and Energy All Items
1975 9.1 8.9 9.1 9.1
1976 5.8 5.6 6.5 5.7
1977 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.5
1978 7.6 7.8 7.4 7.7
1979 11.3 10.0 9.8 11.4
1980 13.5 11.6 12.4 13.4
1981 10.3 10.0 10.4 10.3
1982 6.2 6.7 7.4 6.0
1983 3.2 3.6 4.0 3.0
1984 4.3 4.7 5.0 3.5
1985 3.6 3.9 4,3 3.5
1986 1.9 3.9 4.0 1.6
1987 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6
1988 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.0
1989 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.8
1990 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.2
1991 4.2 4.6 4.9 4.1
1992 3.0 3.2 3.7 2.9
The average weekly earnings of workers in private nonagricultural
industries, calculated monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, are
provided in current dollars and in constant 1982 dollars.
4 4
43 The information in this table was compiled from several sources. The CPI-U figures for
all items were drawn from Statistical Abstract z993, cited above in note 7, at 482, tbl. 756; the
CPI-W figures, from Economic Indicators Handbook, cited above in note 8, at 227; CPI
DETAILED REPORT, March 1993, at 166, tbl. 6A; and CPI DETAILED REPORT, March 1992, at
167, tbl. 6A. The CPI-U figures up to 19go for all items excluding energy and all items
excluding food and energy, are from Economic Report of the President 1993, cited above in
note 20, at 414, tbl. B-58. The CPI-U figures for 199i and 1992 are from Economic Report of
the President 1994, cited above in note 2o at 339, tbl. B-62. CPI-U is the consumer price index
for all urban consumers; CPI-W is the CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers. In
198o, the CPI-U represented 8o% of the noninstitutional population, and the CPI-W, 32%. See
FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 63.
44 See ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1994, supra note 2o, at 320, tbl. B-4 5;
ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1993, supra note 2o, at 396, tbl. B-42.
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Level Percent Change from
Preceding Year
Year Current Dollars 1982 Dollars Current Dollars 1982 Dollars
1975 $163.53 $293.06 5.7 -3.0
1976 175.45 297.37 7.3 1.5
1977 189.00 300.96 7.7 1.2
1978 203.70 300.89 7.8 0.0
1979 219.91 291.66 8.0 -3.1
1980 235.10 274.65 6.9 -5.8
1981 255.20 270.63 8.5 -1.5
1982 267.26 267.26 4.7 -1.2
1983 280.70 272.52 5.0 2.0
1984 292.86 274.73 4.3 0.8
1985 299.09 271.16 2.1 -1.3
1986 304.85 271.94 1.9 0.3
1987 312.50 269.16 2.5 -1.0
1988 322.02 266.79 3.0 -0.9
1989 334.04 264.22 3.8 -1.0
1990 345.35 259.47 3.3 -1.8
1991 353.98 255.40 2.5 -1.6
1992 363.95 255.22 2.8 -0.1
Income distribution is measured in terms of quintiles. Income
taxes have little effect on income distribution. The following table
shows changes over time with respect to income, before and after tax,
in the United States:
4s See id.
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, TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: HOUSEHOLDS' SHARES 46
(percent)
Income Before Taxes 1991 1990 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1974
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lowest fifth 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2
Second fifth 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.2 10.6
Third fifth 16.0 16.0 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.8 17.1
Fourth fifth 24.1 24.1 24.0 24.4 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.8 24.8 24.6
Highest fifth 46.5 46.4 46.1 45.7 45.3 45.2 45.0 44.4 44.2 43.5
Income After Taxes 1991 1990 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1974
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lowest fifth 4.5 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.9
Second fifth 11.0 10.9 10.4 11.0 11.0 11.1 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.7
Third fifth 16.7 16.6 16.1 17.2 17.2 17.4 17.5 17.8 17.9 17.8
Fourth fifth 24.3 24.0 23.2 24.7 24.8 24.8 24.8 25.0 25.1 24.7
Highest fifth 43.6 43.9 46.1 42.6 42.3 42.1 41.8 40.9 40.6 41.0
No official government statistics reveal the costs and benefits of
government regulation. Private estimates suggest that economic reg-
ulation costs the economy about $46 billion annually, and that social
regulation (principally environmental controls) costs between $78 bil-
lion and $1o7 billion. 47 The benefits of economic regulation appear
low, but the benefits of social regulation range between $42 billion
and $181 billion. 48 No one has fully explored the effects of regulation
on GDP. A 199o study suggested that between i973 and 1985, the
GDP growth rate fell by o.19 percentage points as a result of envi-
ronmental controls. 49 This study does not, however, include the
health benefits of such controls, which probably lead to productivity
gains. There are significant disparities in regulatory policy, especially
with respect to expenditures per life saved:
46 The 1986-199i figures are derived from the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
which uses a slightly different definition of "after-tax" income than Norman Frumkin's Guide
to Economic Indicators. See FRUMKIN, supra note 28, at 75, tbl. I5 (presenting the income
before and after taxes for 1974-85); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1993, supra note 7, at 463, tbl.
722. (presenting the figures for income before and after taxes in iggi); U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 462, tbl. 731 (112th ed. 1992) (pre-
senting the figures for income before and after taxes in i99o); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 449, tbl. 724 (lioth ed. i99o) (describing
income before and after taxes for 1986).
47 See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 249, 253 (199I).
48 See id. at 253.
49 See Dale IV. Jorgensen & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S. Eco-
nomic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314, 315 (1990).
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TABLE 8
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF SELECTED REGULATIONS
5 0
(Cost per premature death averted)
Regulation Agency ($millions 1990)
Unvented Space Heater Ban CPSC 0.1
Underground Construction Standards OSHA-S 0.1
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard NHTSA 0.4
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic) NHTSA 0.8
Low-Altitude Windshear Equip. & Training Stds. FAA 1.3
Hazard Communication Standard OSHA-S 1.6
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines EPA 3.4
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts) EPA 6.1
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines) MSHA 9.2
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP EPA 23.0
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations) EPA 32.9
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 63.5
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 106.9
Asbestos Ban EPA 110.7
1,2-Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard EPA 653.0
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st 3rd) EPA 4190.4
Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 86,201.8
Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard EPA 92,069.7
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving EPA 5,700,000.0
Chemicals
The Federal Bureau of Investigation compiles statistics showing
subjection to violent crime.5 1 The following table reflects changes
over time:
50 See BREYER, supra note 3, at 24-27, tbl. S.
51 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1993, supra note 7, at I89-9o.
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TABLE 9
SUBJECTION TO VIOLENT CRIME
5 2
Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants
Murder and
Violent Non-Negligent Forcible Aggravated
Year Crime Homicide Rape Assault
1975 487.8 9.6 26.3 231.1
1976 467.8 8.8 26.6 233.2
1977 475.9 8.8 29.4 247.0
1978 497.8 9.0 31.0 262.1
1979 548.9 9.7 34.7 286.0
1980 596.6 10.2 36.8 298.5
1981 594.3 9.8 36.0 289.7
1982 571.1 9.1 34.0 289.2
1983 537.7 8.3 33.7 279.2
1984 539.2 7.9 35.7 290.2
1985 556.6 7.9 37.1 302.9
1986 617.7 8.6 37.9 346.1
1987 609.7 8.3 37.4 351.3
1988 637.2 8.4 37.6 370.2
1989 663.1 8.7 38.1 383.4
1990 731.8 9.4 41.2 424.1
1991 758.1 9.8 42.3 433.3
Here, then, are some of the most important indicators of social and
economic well-being. It should be clear that the system for reporting
and disseminating this information is quite ad hoc. There has been
no democratic judgment about the ingredients of such key measures
as GDP, poverty, and unemployment. There is no effort to put some
or many of the indicators into a composite figure, to provide an
indication of general changes over time. Nor does the government
furnish reports offering a clearly accessible survey of social and eco-
nomic indicators.
B. International Measures
The United Nations makes what is probably the most influential
international effort to measure well-being, though there have been
illuminating efforts elsewhere. I summarize several methods here. A
key point is that alternative accounts often place a premium on health
and education as well as per capita income.
i. Human Development Index. - The United Nations publishes
an annual Human Development Report in order to facilitate compar-
ative assessments of government performance.
53
52 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 58, tbl. I (1992).
53 See, e.g., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 199o, supra note 21, at 9.
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(a) Description. - The report ranks 173 countries and contains
comparative information on access to health services and safe water;
numbers of radios, telephones, and televisions; levels of child immu-
nization and malnutrition; public expenditures on education; male-
female wage gaps; levels of homicide, rape, and drug crimes; popu-
lation per doctor; numbers of new AIDS cases; population growth;
energy consumption; pollution levels; and much more.
The United Nations approach places particular emphasis on a
"human development index" (HDI). This figure is calculated on the
basis of longevity, knowledge, and income.5 4 "Longevity" is deter-
mined on the basis of life expectancy at birth.55 "Knowledge" is
calculated by a formula based on adult literacy and mean years of
schooling, with literacy weighted twice as heavily as mean years of
schooling.5 6 To take account of the diminishing value of income, the
"income" ingredient is based on an adjustment of per capita GDP.5 7
The UN measurement weighs the three variables equally. What fol-
lows is the ranking of the first twelve countries in the latest report:
TABLE 10
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX5 8
Real
Life Adult Mean GDP Adjusted
Expectancy Literacy Years Per Real
At Birth Rate of Educational Capita GDP
(years) (%) Schooling Attainment (PPP$) Per HDI
Rank 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 Capita 1990
1. Japan 78.6 99.0 10.7 2.87 17,616 5049 0.983
2. Canada 77.0 99.0 12.1 2.98 19,232 5052 0,982
3. Norway 77.1 99.0 11.6 2.95 16,028 5044 0.979
4. Switzerland 77.4 99.0 11.1 2.90 20,874 5074 0,978
5. Sweden 77.4 99.0 11.1 2.90 17,014 5047 0977
6. USA 75.9 99.0 12.3 3.00 21,449 5075 0.976
7. Australia 76.5 99.0 11.5 2.94 16,051 5044 0,972
8. France 76.4 99.0 11.6 2.94 17,405 5048 0,971
9. Netherlands 77.2 99.0 10.6 2.86 15,695 5042 0.970
10. United Kingdom 75.7 99.0 11.5 2.94 15,804 5043 0,964
11. Iceland 77.8 99.0 8.9 2.72 16,496 5045 0.960
12. Germany 75.2 99.0 11.1 2.90 18,213 5050 0,957
The HDI compiles much valuable information and presents it in
a revealing way. For instance, the United States ranks first in both
per capita GDP and adjusted real GDP; it also ranks first in mean
years of schooling and in overall educational attainment. But it ranks
54 See id. at 11-13.
55 See id. at 12.
56 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1991, at 90 (199i).
57 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 199o, suJpra note 21, at 12.
58 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, supra note 12, at 135, tbl. x.
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sixth overall. The reason is that life expectancy at birth stands at
75.9 years, for a ranking along that dimension of sixteenth.
The UN report demonstrates that there is no necessary connection
between GDP and employment levels.5 9 Moreover, the performance
of some countries appears to be quite variable over time. Notably,
the literacy rate in the United States increased from a comparatively
low 96% in 1985 to a very high 99% in i990.60
An intriguing question concerns the precise relationship among the
HDI's three variables of longevity, knowledge, and income. Some
countries with relatively high income ranks (including Algeria, Na-
mibia, and South Africa) have relatively low HDI ranks. 6 1 Other
countries have HDI ranks that are well above their income ranks
(including China, Colombia, and Uruguay).62
A key issue is whether significant variations exist among groups
within each country. In the United States, for example, whites, stand-
ing alone, rank above Japan in HDI; if American whites lived alone
in their own country, it would rank first in the world. 63 By contrast,
African-Americans rank 3ist, and Hispanics 3 5th. 64 In addition, no
nation's HDI improves after being adjusted for sex inequalities, which
indicates that no nation provides as good lives for women as it does
for men.65 But there are important variations. For example, women's
wages are 88% of men's in France and 85% in Norway, but only 51%
in Japan and 59% in the United States. 6 6
Many other questions involve comparative data not directly re-
flected in the HDI's three principal variables. Between i98o and 1986,
for example, there were only 31 drug crimes per ioo,ooo people per
year in Japan, 25 in Israel, and 38 in the Netherlands, compared with
225 in Canada, 234 in the United States, and 403 in Australia. 6 7 The
reported rape rate in the United States is by far the highest - 1i8
per ioo,ooo women between i5 and 59.68 In Japan, the rate is only
5 per ioo,ooo, and in many countries it is somewhere between i8 and
59 For example, Canada had an unemployment rate in 1990-91 of 10.2% despite a high per
capita GNP. See id. at 201, tbl. 39. Notwithstanding its considerably lower per capita GNP,
Japan's unemployment rate was 2.1%. See id. Switzerland's unemployment rate of 1.3% is the
lowest among industrialized nations, but its per capita GNP is slightly below that of the United
States, which has a 6.6% unemployment rate. See id.
60 Compare HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 199 o , supra note 21, at 129 (listing adult literacy
rate in the U.S. for 1985) with HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, supra note 12, at 135,
tbl. i (listing adult literacy rate in the U.S. for 199o).
61 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, supra note i2, at 136, tbl. i.
62 See id. at r35-36.
63 See id. at 18.
64 See id.
65 See id. at z6.
66 See id. at 296, tbl. 34.
67 See id. at 192, tbl. 30.
68 See id.
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35.69 The United States also has the highest homicide rate, at 8 per
ioo,ooo, compared with 1.5 for Japan and Sweden and somewhere
between 2 and 3 for Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Finland, Austria,
and New Zealand. 70 It should not be surprising that the United States
has the highest rate of prisoners, 426 per ioo,ooo, compared with 94
in Canada, 54 in Switzerland, and 77 in the United Kingdom and in
Germany.71
(b) Difficulties. - The HDI approach has important limitations.
Any "index" will be controversial, and the equal weighting of the three
variables seems somewhat arbitrary. In any case, the three variables
are interrelated. Income can "buy" good educational attainment and
also longevity; people who are poor tend to live shorter lives. So too,
people who are in good health and who are well-educated have a
better chance to .make money. The use of the three variables is
controversial partly because of these complex interrelations. 72
The HDI is also insensitive to ethnic, racial, sex and regional
differences. If, for example, there are important differences between
men and women, people should know about this fact. 73 It is also
possible for a country with a high HDI score to have a number of
people concentrated toward the bottom of the economic ladder and
facing desperate conditions.
2. Alternatives. - Other nations, especially those in Scandinavia,
have implemented interesting alternatives to HDI. The Swedish as-
sessment of "standard of living" is more disaggregated and less math-
ematical than the UN approach. The assessment takes account of
health and access to health care; education and skills; housing; security
of life and property (including freedom from crime); availability of
recreation and cultural resources; employment; income and wealth;
and political participation. 74 Of special interest is the Swedish rejec-
tion of unitary measures of well-being, and the insistence that well-




72 In addition, there is a degree of crudeness in the choice of the three indicators. It might
make sense to include poverty level, access to food, employment figures, and more. Moreover,
educational attainment is not adequately measured by mean years of schooling. Literacy is a
form of educational attainment, but it sets a low floor, and in any case it is far from clear that,
in assessing educational attainment, we should count literacy for two and mean years for one
in some aggregate figure. Perhaps a composite figure could be developed on the basis of a more
precise inquiry into relevant factors. Cf. PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING
AND DESTITUTION 77-78 (1993) (noting the absence of attention to civil and political liberties
in conventional measures of well-being, such as the HDI).
73 The report does, however, try to take distribution into account by using adjusted tables.
See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, supra note 12, at 17, tbl. 1.4.
74 See Robert Erikson, Descriptions of Inequality: The Swedish Approach to Welfare Re-
search, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 67, tbl. i (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1992).
75 It would be possible to have a purely subjective account, but such an account would be
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here is that people may adjust their expectations in light of a status
quo characterized by deprivation and injustice, and for this reason it
is important to see what people can have or become, not merely what
they think about their situation.
Another interesting alternative is a comparative survey of Scan-
dinavian countries, initiated by the University of Helsinki. 76 In ad-
dition to the Swedish factors, the Finnish approach emphasizes the
quality of the biological and physical environment, including air and
water pollution; the nature of relations with other people in the local
community, in the family, and within the workplace; and opportunities
to enjoy nature. 77 The comparative survey is intended to include both
objective and subjective indicators of welfare.
In the same vein, UNICEF lists a wide range of basic indicators,
without attempting to aggregate them. These include male and female
adult literacy rates; life expectancy at birth; income shares of the
lowest 40% and the highest 20% of the population; GDP per capita;
and infant mortality.78 The Netherlands identifies sixteen variables
involving quality of life: three each involving housing, health, spend-
ing power, leisure, and employment, combined with a single variable
for education. 79 There is also an effort to combine these statistics into
an aggregate number showing changes over time for different groups
in the population.8 0 An organization in Washington, D.C. attempts
to measure human suffering through a scale that takes account of
income, inflation, infant mortality, nutrition, access to clean water,
literacy, and personal freedom. 81 Similar aggregative and separate
statistics might be offered for human rights violations. 82
Im. POLITICS, WELL-BEING, AND QUALITY OF LIFE
All this has implications for law and policy. A high priority for
both domestic and international agencies should be to compile accurate
information about quality of life, to allow comparisons across time
subject to distortions. See Ian Miles, Social Indicators for Real-Life Economics, in REAL-LIFE
ECONOMICS, supra note I5, at 283, 287-88; see also SEN, supra note 27, at 22 (rejecting as
inadequate a measure of well-being based on happiness or desire-fulfillment).
76 See Erik Allardt, Having, Loving, Being: An Alternative to the Swedish Model of Welfare
Research, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 74, at 88, 88-89.
77 See id. at 89-90.
78 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN
1987, at 128-29, tbl. 1 (1987).
79 See Miles, supra note 75, at 290.
80 See id.
81 See ROBERT V. HORN, STATISTICAL INDICATORS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES 142-44 (1993).
82 Note especially the attempt to integrate liberties and economic variables in DASGUPTA,
cited above in note 72, at io8-i6. Two efforts at tabulating human rights records in numerical
form are FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 572-75, 578-79 (1992); and CHARLES
HUMANA, WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE passim (3d ed. 1992).
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and space, and to ensure that the relevant reports are widely dissem-
inated.
The American government should compile an annual "quality of
life" report. I cannot give a full account of the appropriate ingredients
of such a report. But it seems clear that the report should include,
among other things, per capita income, poverty, housing, unemploy-
ment, average weekly earnings, inflation, child mortality, longevity,
subjection to violent crime, literacy, and educational attainment. The
report should also specify minimum standards for such things as
income, education, health, and housing. The report should allow for
comparison across regions, between men and women, and among
different racial and ethnic groups.
These comparisons may spur healthy competition to do well along
dimensions that count. If a state knows that it ranks forty-second in,
say, unemployment, there will be both local and national pressure to
make things better. If a state has an especially high level of violent
crime, perhaps priorities can be changed to redress the problem. And
if women are doing much worse than men, or blacks much worse
than whites, the public can see this fact and perhaps take corrective
action.
The quality of life report should be widely disseminated to the
public and, in particular, to the news media. Strong evidence indi-
cates that the media can play a large role in counteracting social
problems by focusing public and private attention and by giving
government the incentives to respond.8 3 Instead of attending to an-
ecdotes and sensational scandals - or offering statements about sup-
posed trends - the news media should focus on the quality of life
report and thus allow debate to be based on actual evidence. The
report may well have an especially important role during elections,
but it could affect deliberation and policymaking more broadly as
well.
A quality of life report of the kind proposed here could produce
two distinct benefits. First, the report may well have desirable social
consequences by facilitating priority-setting, imposing appropriate in-
centives on governmental officials, and fueling public interest in re-
dressing serious problems. Accurate and widely disseminated infor-
mation can be an important check on governmental failure to redress
such problems.8 4 Consider the striking fact that in modern times, no
83 See AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 500-03 (1984) (discussing
the important role of news media in combatting famines).
84 See id.; see also Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. Io & 17,
1994, at 31, 33-34 (emphasizing the importance of free expression and the press to a govern-
ment's willingness to address human suffering).
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country with an active, free, and democratic press appears to have
suffered from famine.3 5
Second, the very process of compiling a quality of life report would
have advantages. We have seen that any conception of what matters
is a product of judgments that may be controversial. Human needs
have a great deal to do with the facts - do people have jobs? do
they have food or housing? - but they are not simply facts. Any
conception of needs is a product of human judgments about what
matters. Consider, for example, the very definitions of poverty and
unemployment, or the decision whether to include comparative data
about groups defined in racial, ethnic, and religious terms. The public
understanding of social problems should itself be a product, at least
in part, of a good process of social deliberation about how needs are
best characterized.8 6 By using GDP as the central indicator of social
welfare while publishing a wide array of unorganized and somewhat
random indicators, the current system offers no such educational ben-
efits.
To say all this is not to suggest that such a report would be simple,
or that it would not create risks. But most of the information is now
compiled and available somewhere; its systematic presentation and
dissemination should not be costly. There is of course a risk of error
and bias, especially in view of the fact that the fortunes of an incum-
bent administration may depend on what emerges. Government ma-
nipulation of official statistics is hardly foreign to American experi-
ence. At the same time, many government agencies have established
a reputation for objectivity, and there is no reason to believe that (for
example) the statistics relating to literacy, infant mortality, and pov-
erty levels reflect substantial bias.
To be sure, people have limited information-processing capacities,
and these can lead to systematic errors through the use of bad heu-
ristics. Some release of information can actually make things worse.
But to some extent the confusion is a result of what has been made
public, and careful presentation of the data should help overcome
some of the faulty heuristics. One of the most common heuristics, for
example, is that of "availability."8 7 People seem to think that events
are more probable if an occurrence can easily be brought to mind.
85 See Sen, supra note 84, at 34.
86 See id. at 32. Sen writes:
Political rights can have a major role in providing incentives and information toward the
solution of economic privation. But the connections between rights and needs are not
merely instrumental; they are also constitutive. For our conceptualization of economic
needs depends on open public debates and discussions, and the guaranteeing of those
debates and those discussions requires an insistence on political rights.
Id.
87 See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 241-42 (1993).
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Some of this effect might be counteracted by a report that catalogues
a range of events, that allows comparisons, and that shows changes
over time. The very need to compile the data would also give desir-
able incentives to government officials.88
I have suggested that both personal and social well-being are in
important respects a product of law; that is, they are a function of
the things to which the law gives people access. The law can give
such access in many ways. It may provide guarantees of certain goods
(such as housing, food, medical care); it may allow people to sell their
labor; it may permit people to own certain things that they produce
or inherit; and it may say that people can freely exchange some, but
not all, of what they own. People's entitlements are a function of
law, and it is their entitlements that enable them to obtain much of
what provides for their well-being. We lack a systematic account of
the relationship between legal entitlements and the components of
well-being.
These points have general implications. A homeless person, for
example, is deprived of shelter in important part through the law; if
he tries to sleep in a place with a roof, the law will call him a
trespasser and subject him to civil and criminal penalties.8 9 Whether
someone has access to medical care depends on the bundle of legal
rights that have been conferred. Property rights as we know them
are not brute or natural facts, but a product of laws granting and
conditioning entitlements of different kinds. 90 It should ultimately be
possible to link various components of well-being to different legal
permissions and requirements. We could begin to connect depriva-
tions and benefits of various sorts with a range of legal provisions. A
quality of life report would help initiate this endeavor.
Of course, no report can substitute for actual reform. What mat-
ters is what is done, not what is said. But in some contexts, what is
done is a function of what is said. In the area of risk regulation, for
example, there is evidence that disclosure of information can be an
important regulatory tool, prompting corrective action by employers,
employees, and governments generally. 9' In any case, both citizens
88 A similar report should be compiled in other nations and be made available for interna-
tional comparison and review. See Cass R. Sunstein, Information, Please, 2 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 54, 54 (1993).
89 See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295,
304 (1991).
90 Amartya Sen writes:
Finally, the focus on entitlement has the effect of emphasizing legal rights. Other relevant
factors, for example market forces, can be seen as operating through a system of legal
relations (ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal exchanges, etc.). The law stands
between food availability and food entitlement. Starvation deaths can reflect legality
with a vengeance.
SEN, supra note 24, at 165-66.
91 See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP Viscusi, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULA-
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and public officials are unlikely to know what to do unless they have
good information about existing problems and trends. These points
have general and complex consequences for the study of law, but I
end with a simple claim: Democratic governments could take few
more important steps than to initiate a process by which the compo-
nents of well-being would become a substantial part of political de-
bate.
TION x86-88 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First
Amendment, 2o FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 662 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel
Huber, Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: an Empirical Evaluation of Hazard
Warnings, 17 RAND J. ECON. 351, 362 (1986) (concluding, based on empirical study, that
warning labels affect consumer behavior).
HeinOnline  -- 107 Harv. L. Rev.  1327 1993-1994
